Stoneridge - A Walk for Corporate Fraudsters?
Will 2007 be the year known as the year the corporate fraudsters were given a "walk" by the Supreme Court? Right now the fraudsters have been pitched four ball, and it certainly looks like a walk for the fraudsters:
- Ball One: In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,127 S. Ct. 1955 (May 21, 2007), the Supreme Court tossed the long standing pleading standard in corporate conspiracy cases, requiring injured parties to plead enough facts " to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement,” noting that "discovery can be expensive;"
- Ball Two: In Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (June 18, 2007), the Court tossed a private antitrust suit alleging anticompetitive activities by underwriters in the issuance of initial public offerings, stating in the most conclusory and broadly speculative terms, that "the threat of antitrust lawsuits, through error and disincentive, could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways" and was, in essence, preempted by the securities laws;
- Ball Three: In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd , 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2007 WL 1773208 (June 21, 2007), tossed the notion that at the pleading stage, before any discovery had begun, that the injured securities purchaser was entitled to all inferences being drawn in the plaintiffs favor. Instead, “to curb perceived abuses of the § 10(b) private action—‘nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by class action lawyers’” a "complaint will survive...only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged;” and
- BALL FOUR....WALK: The U.S. Supreme Court decision today in Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, where, by a vote of 5-3, the Court tossed wide of home plate, any notion that "scheme liability" exists in the context of private causes of actions under the securities laws because investors cannot be said to rely on fraudulent schemes they do not know exist. This leaves sole enforcement and recovery in the hands of that same under-funded, under-manned, out-gunned, SEC that now has to handle all those antitrust issues( See Ball Three ), at least until a new Congress and a new President, untethered to Corporate Lobbyists, come to the rescue, and rectify this unintelligible and illogical mess. Of course I would not be so critical if this were anything other than a policy decision devoid of fact.
In throwing ball four, and hence a walk to corporate conspirators committing deceptive acts, the Court reasoned that even though the act may be deceptive, and intentionally so, the Court will not allow a presumption that investors rely upon a third party's actions or statements. Justice Kennedy wrote:
To do so might sweep all conspiring suppliers and customers out of the game of accountability for the huge damage they contribute too. The Court, in outright protectionism of Corporate Fraud, rejected the irrefutable fact and logic that:
Whew!!!! I didn't know that deception was such a part of our society that we needed to protect fraud conspirators from their own wrongdoing. Rather, the Court decided, as a matter of unsupported fact and law that these conspiring vendors:
So, even though the vendors knew their deceptive billings would inflate Stoneridge's revenues, and that there was no other purpose for the deception, since the public only relied on the false aggregate revenue numbers and not the vendors bills themselves, the Court finds as a matter of law and fact that there can be no reliance???? What happened to the requirement of evidentiary proof and the jury system?
Ohhh, yes, I remember now what the Court said about that. If we hold corporate conspirators liable:
No, we would not want that. We need foreign corporate conspirators to keep our economy running!!!!
Even more confusing is the Court's implication that state law remedies are sufficient:
What state law guarantees is the Court talking about? Has the Supreme Court forgotten about the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 that preempts class actions that allege fraud under state law "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities?
Today's ruling will be followed soon by the Ernon case against the investment banking firms who helped Enron create the fraudulent financial vehicles that dupped investors to buy Enron stock— California Regents v. Merrill Lynch, et al. (06-1341) ("Enron").
Can the Court find a difference where the wrongdoer is not a supplier or a customer? Can it be said that investors do not rely on fraudulent transactions with customers but do rely on fraudulent transactions with those more closely engaged in keeping the issuer involved in the securities market, such as lawyers, auditors, bankers and underwriters?
Letting a customer off the hook, when the customer actually bought the goods is one thing, but letting off the lawyers, auditors, bankers and underwriters off the hook when they actually got paid to help commit the fraud, is another. No one will riot over the first. The second will rally a lot of troops as we sit in the middle of this subprime mortgage meltdown.
There is a hint that the Court is not dull and could pick off one or two of these corporate conspirators who take too big of a lead-off.
First, the Court notes, in talking about these supplier/customer defendants, that their actions were "beyond the securities markets—the realm of financing business – to purchase and supply contracts – the realm of ordinary business." Clearly a distinction would be drawn against the investment bankers in Enron.
Second, the Court states that:
It may be arguable, in Enron, that the investment bankers misled or acted with the auditors, or did take action that that "made it necessary or inevitable for [Enron] to record the transactions the way it did." Or the Court may see what they did in Enron as being in the "investment sphere," which it was.
Finally, in another good omen for investors, the Supreme Court rejected, out right, the oft repeated contention that one must make a deceptive statement to be liable under §10(b):
So the game is not over. Traditional suppliers and customers of goods are safe on base and off. The bankers, the lawyers, the accountants, and the underwriters better keep tight on base....at least until the next pitch....
For more see Jay Brown's weblog.
Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcript